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Williams: Insurance: Florida's Nonjoinder Statute Declared Constitutional

INSURANCE: FLORIDA'S NONJOINDER STATUTE
DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL
VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Co., 439
So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983)
Appellant brought suit against a supermarket and its insurance
carrier seeking damages for the supermarket's alleged negligence.1
The trial court found Florida's nonjoinder, statute2 constitutional
and, because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory condition
precedent for joinder,3 dismissed the insurer from the suit.4 The First
District Court of Appeal certified the issue to the Florida Supreme
Court5 which affirmed the trial courts and HELD, the nonjoinder
statute is a substantive enactment and therefore does not unconstitu-7
tionally invade the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking authority.
1. 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983). Appellant, Ara Williams VanBibber, sought damages from
appellees, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Insurance Co. & Publix Supermarkets, alleging
that her injury was caused by the supermarket's negligence. Id.
2. The statute referred to by the trial court is the 1982 revision. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262
(Supp. 1982), current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1983).
3. FL. STAT. § 627.7262 (1983) reads as follows:
Nonjoinders of insurers.(1) It shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance "of a cause of
action against a liability insurer by a person not an insured under the terms of the liability insurance contract that such person shall first obtain a judgment against a person
who is an insured under the terms of such policy for a cause of action which is covered
by such policy.
(2) No person who is not an insured under the terms of a liability insurance policy
shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third-party beneficiary or otherwise,
prior to first obtaining a judgment against a person who is an insured under the terms of
such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such policy.
(3) Insurers are affirmatively granted the substantive right to insert in liability insurance policies contractual provisions that preclude persons who are not designated as
insureds in such policies from bringing suit against such insurers prior to first obtaining
a judgment against one who is an insured under such policy for a cause of action which is
covered by such policy. The contractual provisions authorized in this subsection shall be
fully enforceable.
4. 439 So. 2d at 881 & n.1.
5. Id. at 881. The district court deemed the case "as passing on a question of great public
importance or as having a great effect on the administration of justice throughout the state."
Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
Id.
6. 439 So. 2d at 883. The Court, however, reversed the trial court's holding as the statute
applies to the instant case because the statute was solely prospective in operation and therefore
did not apply to a cause of action occurring prior to its effective date, Oct. 1, 1982. Id.
7. Id. at 882-83. The rule making authority of the Supreme Court is found in article V,
section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) provides:
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Absent legislative action, public policy may be judicially established.' Prior to the passage of the original nonjoinder statute,9 the
Florida Supreme Court was the sole policymaker concerning joinder
or nonjoinder of motor vehicle liability insurers.1 0 In Artille v. Davidson, the plaintiff sustained injuries in an automobile accident caused
by the insured. 1 Arguing he was a third party beneficiary of the contract between the insured and the insurer, the plaintiff sought to join
the parties in suit. 2 The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's third
party beneficiary contention and ruled that because the appellant
was not in privity with the insurer, the insurer was not liable in tort
to the plaintiff."3 The court therefore held the plaintiff had no cause
of action against the insurer. 4
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the administrative supervision of all courts, the
transfer to the court having jurisdiction of any proceeding when the jurisdiction of another court has been improvidently invoked, and a requirement that no cause shall be
dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought. These rules may be repealed by
general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the
legislature.
8. Baker v. United States, 27 F.2d 863, 875 (1st Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656
(1929).
9. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1976):
Nonjoinder of insurers.(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant in an
action to determine the insured's liability. However, each insurer which does or may
provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any judgment which might
be entered in the action shall file a statement, under oath, of a corporate officer setting
forth the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance:
(a) The name of the insurer. (b) The name of each insured. (c) The limits of liability
coverage. (d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which said insurer reasonably believes is available to said insurer filing the statement at the time of filing
said statement.
(2) The statement required by subsection (1) shall be amended immediately upon
discovery of facts calling for an amendment to said statement.
(3) If the statement or any amendment thereto indicates that a policy or coverage
defense has been or will be asserted, then the insurer may be joined as a party.
(4) After the rendition of a verdict, or final judgment by the court if the case is tried
without a jury, the insurer may be joined as a party and judgment may be entered by the
court based upon the statement or statements herein required.
(5) The rules of discovery shall be available to discover the existence and policy
provisions of liability insurance coverage.
10. See Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 220, 170 So. 707, 708 (1936).
11. Id. at 220, 170 So. at 708.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. The court held that, where there has been no breach of contract creating in
the insured a present right to maintain an action on the policy, such right cannot accrue to
another by reason of having a claim against the insured. Id.
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Thirty-three years later, Artille was overruled in the seminal case
of Shingleton v. Bussey.15 In Shingleton, the plaintiff brought suit
against the insured and insurer for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The Florida Supreme Court overruled Artille and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the insurer as a party defendant.
Thus, Florida became the first state to adopt direct action by judicial
fiat.' 6
The court based its decision on the previously discarded third
party beneficiary rationale and held that an injured member of the
public does benefit from the contract between the insured and the
insurer. 17 Moreover, the right to join the insurer vested when the injured party became entitled to sue the insured.'" The decision thus
permitted inclusion of liability insurers as party defendants in suits
stemming from the insured's negligent acts.' 9 While noting that nonjoinder precluded possible prejudice by preventing jury knowledge of
insurance coverage, the Shingleton court felt juries had matured
since Artille. Indeed, knowledge of coverage 20 could benefit insurers
by allowing the jury to adjust any damage award according to the
policy's limits. 2 ' The court further determined that the parties could
not contract for nonjoinder 22 unless the legislature affirmatively au15.

223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).

16. Id. at 715, 718. The court modified the nonjoinder rule as a matter of public policy.
Public policy is a device available to the judicial process to incorporate "changing realities" and
the "related rules of fair play" into our legal system. Id. at 715. See Lee & Polk, Insurance, 31
U. MAn L. REv. 1061, 1065 (1977).
17. 223 So. 2d at 716. Support for this judicial determination was assumed from the intent of the parties. The court noted that parties to a liability policy contract contemplate injury
to a third party. Id. Therefore, by operation of law, an injured party becomes a third party
beneficiary and is entitled to maintain a cause of action directly against the insurer of the
tortfeasor. Id.
18. Id. Although the liability of the insured for judgment is a condition precedent to the
liability of the insurer for judgment, the court found that this condition would not initially
affect the insurer's liability to be sued. Id. at 716-17.
19. See Lee & Polk, supra note 16, at 1065.
20. 223 So. 2d at 718. The court felt that this approach would be more beneficial than the
"ostrich head in the sand" approach which often misled juries into thinking that insurance
coverage was greater than it actually was. Id. In addition, the court reasoned that the initial
joinder of insurance companies was desirable because this procedure placed "all the cards on
the table," including possible defenses to the claim. Id. at 720. Also, initial joinder would eliminate the need for additional or collateral proceedings to enforce the judgment since the insurer
would be a party to the original suit. See id. Thus, initial joinder might reduce the multiplicity
of suits. Id. at 718.
21. 223 So. 2d at 718. The court felt that complete disclosure of the insurer's interest in
the outcome of the case would diminish their total policy judgment payments. Failure to disclose often misled juries into thinking insurance coverage was greater than it was. Id.
22. Id. at 717-19. The court, citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4, found that nonjoinder clauses in
liability policies infringed upon the plaintiff's right to a speedy trial. Id. at 717. The plaintiff's
recovery was delayed because the clauses effectively postponed liability by prohibiting direct
action against the insurer. Id.
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thorized insurers to include nonjoinder clauses in the policies.2 3
In 1976 the legislature enacted original section 627.7262, modifying the Shingleton joinder rule.24 In Markert v. Johnston, however,
the Florida Supreme Court declared the statute an unconstitutional
infringement of its rulemaking authority. 5 The court found section
627.7262 a procedural rule because it merely designated the precise
moment when a motor vehicle insurer became a real party in interest.2" Because timing of joinder is a procedural matter within the exclusive province of the court's rulemaking power, the court held the
statute invalid. 7 The court failed, however, to indicate whether Shingleton, in establishing the insurer's status as a real party in interest, created a substantive or procedural right to joinder.2"
The instant case addressed the constitutionality of the most recent version of section 627.7262.29 Finding this nonjoinder statute
23. Id. at 718. This legislative action would apparently prevent the joinder of the insurer
pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a). Id. Under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), joinder may occur as
follows:
(a) Parties Generally. Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another or a
party expressly authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him
the party for whose benefit the action is brought. All persons having an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as plaintiffs and any
person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff.
Any person may at any time be made a party if his presence is necessary or proper to a
complete determination of the cause. Persons having a united interest may be joined on
the same side as plaintiffs or defendants, and when any one refuses to join, he may for
such reason be made a defendant.
One year after Shingleton, in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970), the
court extended initial joinder from automobile liability insurers to liability insurers in all tort
claims. Id. at 165.
24. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1976). See supra note 9. In cases arising out of accidents occurring on or after Oct. 1, 1976, the liability carrier could not be joined as a party to the action
until after the trial unless it intended to assert a policy or coverage defense. However, final
judgment could include an award against the insurance company even though it was not previously a defendant. See Lee & Polk, supra note 16, at 1065.
25. 367 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1978).
26. Id. at 1005.
27. Id. at 1006.
28. Id. at 1005. The court avoided ruling on this issue by holding that the insurer was a
real party in interest. The court stated that § 627.7262 was consistent with Shingleton in that
the statute also recognized insurers as the real parties in interest. Id. The court refused to
adopt the substance of the statute as a rule of procedure, as advocated in the concurring opinion. Id. at 1006. See also Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976) (court adopted
reference to joinder as a rule of procedure for medical malpractice trials), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977).
29. See supra note 3. See also supra note 9. Both houses introduced similar bills which
restated the joinder policy. FLA. STAT. 1239 (Reg. Sess. 1979, introduced by Comm. on Commerce & Sen. Barron, MacKay, McLain & Hair); FLA. H.R. 1471 (Reg. Sess. 1979, introduced by
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substantive rather than procedural, the court held the statute constitutional.30 The present statute, unlike the prior version, requires a
third-party interest to vest by judgment as a condition precedent to
joinder."' Additionally, "the present statute specifically authorizes a
contractual provision prohibiting direct third-party suits.

'3 2

Because

of these differences, the court found the legislature went beyond
merely controlling the timing of joinder and enacted a substantive
statute.33 The majority realized that although public policy can be
judicially determined, such a determination must yield to "valid, contrary legislative pronouncement.

'34

Thus, the court found the policy

announced in Shingleton of allowing simultaneous joinder of the insurer no longer prevailed. 5
Rep. Gallagher). Although Markert frustiated the legislative intent of nonjoinder, the legislature could reassert its constitutional prerogative because the full court never ruled that denial
of joinder is outside the purview of the legislature. 367 So. 2d at 1004. In fact, the court in
Shingleton had specifically stated that the legislature may provide for nonjoinder. 223 So. 2d at
718-19.
Although neither bill was enacted, the senate bill was endorsed by a full committee. FLA. S.
1239 was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, which adopted a Committee Substitute (FLA. CS) for FLA. S.1239 in lieu of the original bill. FLA. CS for FLA.S.1239 was favorably
referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Calendar, where it remained until the end of
the session. FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, SENATE BILL ACTIONS REPORT at
315 (Reg. Sess. 1979). The Committee Substitute for the senate bill provided the language and
policy for the new nonjoinder statute. See supra note 3.
30. 439 So. 2d at 883. The court upheld FLA.STAT. § 627.7262 (1983) on the grounds that
it was a substantive enactment by the legislature. Id. However, the court held that the statute
had no application to a cause of action predicated on events which occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, Oct. 1, 1982. Id. Therefore, Shingleton and Markert controlled the suit.
Id.
The court stated that this successor statute would fail on the grounds enunciated in Markert if it was found procedural and not substantive. 439 So. 2d at 882. The third-party beneficiary concept was altered to provide that an injured party had no beneficial interest in a liability policy until that party had first obtained a judgment against an insured. Id.
31. Id. at 882-83. "The statute transfers the accrual of a beneficial interest from the date
of occurrence until the time an action brought on a tort has matured to a judgment." Id. at 882.
The statute clearly states "that no cause of action against an insurance company shall accrue
until a judgment against an insured is obtained." Id.
32. Id. at 883. The statute "authorized insurance companies to insert nonjoinder provisions in their insurance policies." Id. at 882. This provision was derived from language in Shingleton that said:
This requirement of the procedural rules raises the presumption that unless the Legislature in the exercise of its police power regulation of insurance, affirmatively gives insurers the substantive right to insert "no joinder" clauses in liability policies there is no
basis in law for insurers to assume they have such contractual right as a special privilege
not granted other citizens to contract immunity with their insureds from being sued as
joint defendants by strangers.
223 So.
33.
34.
35.

2d at 718-19.
439 So. 2d at 882. See Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1006.
Id. at 883.
Id. "In Shingleton, we found that public policy authorized an action against an insur-
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Justice Shaw, concurring in part and dissenting in part, cited Shingleton and concluded the policy factors considered then remained
persuasive.3 6 Justice Shaw argued public policy still requires all parties in interest be brought to court immediately to "protect their
rights, to facilitate the litigation, and to resolve the dispute. 37 Recognizing other constitutional infirmities Justice Shaw found that the
nonjoinder clause contravenes the fundamental constitutional rights
of access to the courts and due process." These rights guarantee
courts shall afford injured persons legal remedy without denial or delay.39 Justice Shaw contended that even if section 627.7262 concerned
only substantive rights, the legislature still cannot abrogate a right of
action, deny due process, nor delay court access in violation of the
state constitution.40 In conclusion, Justice Shaw stated that although
a legislative act is deemed good public policy, a court should not defer to the legislature when a constitutional right is violated.4 '
The Florida Supreme Court held the instant statute constitutional because it is a substantive, rather than a procedural, enactment."' The court's analysis, however, inadequately articulated the
distinctions between the instant "substantive" statute and the "procedural" statute discussed in Markert. Although theoretical distincance company by a third-party beneficiary prior to judgment. The legislature has now determined otherwise." Id.
36. Id. at 884 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Applying Shingleton,
Justice Shaw concluded that FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 violates both the due process requirements
of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 and the right of access to the courts of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. Id. at
885. Presumably, if the legislature could abolish the right of joinder, then it could also abrogate
any other right that had been established by the judiciary and ratified by the electorate in
adopting the Constitution.
37. Id. at 884. Justice Shaw favorably cited Chief Justice Ervin's majority opinion in Shingleton. There Justice Ervin stated that motor vehicle liability insurance was commonplace,
statutorily required and primarily for the benefit of injured third parties. Therefore, it was
unrealistic to defer accural of the cause of action against the insurer until judgment was obtained against the insured defendant because the liability insurer was the real party in interest.
Id.
38. Id. at 883.
39. Id. at 884. Justice Shaw reasoned these rights which are embodied in the federal and
state constitutions were inserted precisely because they were good public policies. Id. Justice
Shaw recognized that the "denial of a direct action against the liability insurer may impermissibly serve to defeat recovery and deprive the plaintiff 'of an open, speedy and realistic opportunity to pursue by due process his right of an adequate remedy at law jointly against the insured
and the insurer.'" Id. at 885 (quoting Chief Justice Ervin in Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 719).
40. Id. at 885.
41. Id. at 884-85. In his dissent, Justice Shaw stated that the legislature cannot abrogate
a right of action established by Shingleton, and ratified by the electorate when it adopted the
constitution of 1968. Id. at 885. Justice Boyd also wrote an opinion dissenting with the majority's approval of § 627.7262. Id. at 886-87 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 883. The Markert holding was used to compare the substantive versus procedural aspects. Id. at 882. See also supra notes 3 & 9 (provide present and prior versions of
joinder statute).
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tions are readily available, the practical distinction between substance and procedure is difficult to ascertain.43 Procedural concepts
include the "course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps.

.

." in which litigation proceeds."' Substantive law en-

compasses those rules and principles which determine primary
rights.45 Utilizing these definitions, the basis of the Markert holding,
the timing of joinder, seems to fall correctly into the procedural category.46 In the instant case, the statute's requirement that a thirdparty interest vest by judgment as a condition precedent to an action
against an insurer could be labeled either substantive or procedural.47
The vesting requirement does affect the "course" and "order" of
litigation. 48 Because the third-party beneficiary must first obtain a
judgment against the insured,49 two trials may result. Therefore, the
vesting requirement may be only a less obvious version of the timing
aspect and thus procedural. Alternatively, however, the vesting requirement does modify a third-party's right to collect from an insured. Moreover, the legislature can constitutionally prescribe substantive rules,50 and these rules may modify procedural rights while
retaining their substantive characteristics. Consistent with Shingleton's recognition that legislative authorization of nonjoinder contract provisions affects substantive rights,51 the court held the instant
legislative enactment allowing for nonjoinder constitutional.52
The majority's analysis of the revised statute also failed to provide an in-depth explanation of the public policy behind the legislature's action. The court merely stated that its public policy decision
must yield to a "valid, contrary legislative pronouncement."53 The
majority did not, however, attempt to determine whether the legislature's policy goal, to keep insurance costs down, wds in fact valid."
43. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1004.
44. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J.,
concurring).
45. Id. at 65.
46. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 3.
48. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d at 66.
49. FLA.STAT. § 627.7262(1), (2) (1983).
50. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1004.
51. 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
52. 439 So. 2d at 883.
53. Id. The court can determine public policy in the absence of a legislative pronouncement. Id.
54. The public policy underlying the statute was not enunciated by the court. FLA. STAT. §
627.7262 (1983). The bill, FLA. CS for FLA. S. 1239 (Reg. Sess. 1979), under which this statute
was passed, provides that "it is the intent of the Legislature, through the exercise of its inherent police power, to regulate insurance and to implement this public policy by the substantive
law set forth in this section." Id. § 1(1).
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Such deference to a legislative pronouncement of public policy is
proper. The Florida Supreme Court's perception of public policy
should not control a legislative enactment which dictates public policy and delineates a substantive right, regardless of whether such
right also possesses incidents of procedure.
The instant case presented an opportunity for the Florida Supreme Court to review the amended nonjoinder statute previously
declared unconstitutional.5 Although the decision appears to be correct, the court should define more precisely the difference between
substance and procedure. While the current nonjoinder statute has a
procedural aspect, it would seem the legislature has remained within
its constitutional parameters by establishing public policy and addressing a substantive issue. The legislature, perceiving rising insurance costs as a problem of their constituents, has taken action to control these rising costs. The Florida Supreme Court should not be able
to frustrate the legislature's intent merely because it perceives a conflicting public policy.
REUBEN SHARP WILLIAMS IV

The legislature was under pressure to keep insurance costs down, and this may be the best
definition of public policy that is available. Lee & Mussetto, Insurance, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV.
765, 767 (1979). This line of reasoning is further strengthened by the fact that although the
revised statute is placed in Part XI of the insurance code, FLA. STAT. Ch. 627, Part XI Motor
Vehicle and Casualty Insurance Contracts, it is not specifically limited to motor vehicle liability
insurers. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1976) provided: "(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer. .... "
Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1983) which provides: "(1) It shall be a condition precedent
to the accrual or maintenance of a cause of action against a liability insurer ..
" Id.
55. Since the instant case was decided, Florida district courts of appeal have ruled on
cases citing VanBibber as authority. In each case the appellate court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the liability insurer on the grounds that the cause of action arose before the effective date of § 627.7262, Oct. 1, 1982. See, e.g., Kaminsky v. Travelers Indem. Co., 443 So. 2d
206 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983); Geller v. G. & G. Corp., 442 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983); Harris
v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 442 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983); Kneski
v. City of Miramar & Am. Druggists' Ins. Co., 441 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983); Randel v.
General Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983).
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